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An important aspect of intergenerational justice concerns the specification of a 
‘currency of advantage’ that can be used to evaluate distributive outcomes across 
time. Environmental theorists have introduced several innovative currencies of justice 
in recent years, such as ecological space and critical natural capital. However they 
have often downplayed the application of established currencies (such as welfare, 
resources or capabilities) to issues of futurity. After exploring the merits of a number 
of rival currencies, it is argued that the currency of ‘capabilities to function’ provides 
a promising basis for a theory of justice that takes seriously the rights and duties of 
intergenerational justice.  
 
Introduction  
Any complete theory of intergenerational justice, which I take to be concerned with 
the equitable distribution of benefits and burdens across different generations, must 
address three issues (Dobson 1998:64ff; Page 2006: 50-52). The first of these, the 
‘scope of justice’, concerns the entities identified as legitimate recipients (and 
providers) of benefits and burdens. The second issue concerns the ‘pattern of justice’, 
that is, the level of benefit to which each subject of justice is entitled. The third issue, 
which is the focus of this article, concerns the specification of a ‘currency of 
advantage (or benefit)’ in terms of which alternative accounts of the pattern and 
scope of justice operate. Uniting these issues, we can say that a complete theory of 
intergenerational justice involves us specifying which entities should receive a certain 
level of benefit as calculated in terms of some credible conception of advantage. 
 While several competing currencies have been defended in the literature on 
distributive justice (welfare, resources, capabilities to function), there have been 
relatively few attempts to apply these currencies to questions of distribution between 
generations. Where they have been so applied, for example by environmental 
philosophers, the currencies so ingrained in wider political philosophical circles have 
generally been viewed as a barrier to, rather than an embodiment of, environmental 
and intergenerational justice (Dobson 1998:40ff; Chambers, Simmons and 
Wackernagel 2000:15ff; Dobson 2003:99ff; Hayward 2006:359ff). Yet, these 
critiques have often relied on brief analyses of theories of social justice; ignored the 
deeper connections between established and new currencies; and failed to consider in 
any detail the possibility that any of the established currencies could be revised to 
ground a robust theory of intergenerational justice.  
 The aim of the article is to contribute to the development of intergenerational 
justice by exploring the merits of a number of alternative currencies that might be 
applied to issues of futurity. I argue that, although the adoption of any of the main 
currencies implies that future benefits and burdens matter from the point of view of 
justice, there are subtle differences of justification and application amongst rival 
currencies. I also argue that there are a range of considerations in favour of adopting a 
modified account of ‘capabilities to function’ as the appropriate currency of justice 
both within and between generations. 
2  The size of the topic at hand necessitates several simplifying assumptions. The 
discussion is guided by a humanist and universalist approach according to which the 
primary concern of a theory of distributive justice is to establish the claims and 
responsibilities of individual human beings where their temporal or geographical 
location is viewed as morally irrelevant. The approach is also broadly egalitarian in 
that it assumes that benefits and burdens should be distributed equally or according to 
some related distributive ideal such as priority or sufficiency,  and not in line with 
historical principles of justice as maintained by libertarian theorists. I focus on 
undeserved disadvantages and put to one side the problem of disadvantages that are 
deserved in the sense that they reflect an agent’s autonomous choices. Finally, in 
order to avoid a wholly abstract discussion of the merits of alternative currencies, I 
draw upon the science and impacts of global climate change as a way of exploring 
the implications of each currency on our dealings with future generations.  
 
Welfarism and Justice 
A useful, and common, starting point for the literature on the currency of justice is 
welfarism. This is the view that welfare - defined as some function of a person’s 
desires (or preferences) being satisfied - is the only value that should be taken 
‘seriously, ultimately and for its own sake’ (Sumner 1996:3). According to the 
egalitarian variant of welfarism, justice obtains in a population when no further 
transfer of resources would leave its members more equal in terms of welfare 
(Sumner 1996:9-10; Dworkin 2000:12).  
 Embracing welfare egalitarianism would have important implications for 
intergenerational justice. Take the example of climate change. The welfare enjoyed 
by future persons will be influenced by their ability to fulfil the many desires 
conditional on maintaining a high level of physical and mental health. People desire 
to be healthy and to achieve a normal lifespan as such, but they also have numerous 
further desires that are dependent on their physical and mental health. Climate 
change, through increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, 
increasing global temperature and rising sea levels will have a profound impact upon 
human health and longevity in the future and as a result the capacity of future 
generations to fulfil their desires. In its latest assessment in 2001, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that the economic, social 
and health impacts of climate change will reduce the welfare of many millions of 
people in the future, as well as exacerbate existing global inequalities of welfare 
between developed and developing countries (White 2001:21ff; McMichael and 
Githeko 2001). As the IPCC observed in its earlier 1996 assessment, the spectre of 
such a lowering of welfare, raises ‘particular questions of equity among generations’ 
(Arrow et al 1996:130).   
 Despite the apparently intuitive application of welfarism to issues of futurity, 
welfare seems implausible as a currency of justice (Sen 1999: 62ff; Dworkin 
2000:21ff; Brighouse 2004:68-70). One problem is that welfare is liable to subsidise 
the lifestyles of those who have cultivated desires that are expensive to fulfil at the 
cost of those whose desires are easier to fulfil. A second problem is that there is no 
obvious way that welfarists can ignore the welfare created by fulfilling morally 
objectionable desires, such as those bound up with racist or sexist lifestyles. A third 
problem is that welfare egalitarianism seems to ignore the plight of people who are 
3 impoverished in terms of other currencies but at least as well off as others in society 
in terms of welfare because they have learned to desire what is realistically 
achievable given their harsh circumstances. 
 The ‘adaptive desires problem’ has particular application to discussions of 
justice and futurity. It is in many respects obvious that the behaviour of earlier 
generations influences the nature of the desires that later generations come to 
entertain. One example is the way that alternative social, educational and cultural 
policies help shape the desires of each generation. But future people might also adapt 
their desires in the face of environmental decay quite independently of the intentions 
of their predecessors. Imagine that members of later generations come to adapt their 
preferences to an environment transformed by climate change by desiring less 
intensely the resources affected. They might learn not to desire so intensely access to 
clean air, water and a mild climate; or learn to desire the possibilities offered by a 
warmer and wetter climate. They may, that is, adapt their desires so that they become 
‘contended victims’ of climate change. Welfare egalitarianism would recognise no 
issue of injustice arising between the earlier and later generations in such cases.  
 We can sum up the above by observing that welfarism is trapped within the 
logic of ‘weak sustainability. It cannot, that is, offer any independent argument for 
the preservation of natural resources, such as the climate system, aside from the way 
that these resources service human desires (Daly 1995; Howarth 1997:570-73). 
 
Resourcism and Justice 
According to a popular alternative to welfarism, justice should focus on the 
distribution of impersonal resources, such as income and wealth, required by all to 
lead a life of high quality. One classic example of resourcist thinking can be found in 
the work of John Rawls. Rawls held that, subject to favourable circumstances, 
distributive justice obtains when ‘social primary goods’ are distributed amongst a 
population so that, unless the worst off gain from their unequal distribution, these 
goods are shared evenly (2001:42). The social primary goods, such as income and 
wealth, freedom of movement, freedom of thought, and the social bases of self-
respect, can be seen as the all-purpose means required by persons to pursue what they 
want out of life. They are under the direct control of mechanisms of social justice, 
such as social taxation, education and employment; and can be distributed evenly or 
unevenly amongst a given population (Rawls 2001:58-61).  
 Rawls did not apply his ‘primary goods egalitarianism’ to issues of 
intergenerational distribution in any systematic fashion, although he did argue that 
each generation is bound by extensive duties of conservation and investment that are 
best viewed as independent of those generated by social justice (1971:292ff). 
Moreover, he at no stage discussed the possibility that access the natural environment 
could be treated as a social primary good (Dobson 1998:126). Yet, other writers 
working in the Rawlsian tradition have extended the currency of primary goods 
across generations and nations with interesting results. 
 One writer who adopts a more generous interpretation of impersonal resources, 
while retaining a broadly Rawlsian framework, is Brian Barry. Barry argues that the 
consumption of impersonal resources over time, ‘should be compensated for in the 
sense that later generations should be left no worse off (in terms of productive 
4 capacity) than they would have been without the depletion’ (1989:519). Although 
Barry does not define precisely what he means by ‘productive capacity’, the crux of 
the view is clear. This is that intergenerational justice only obtains when earlier 
generations refrain from worsening the opportunities available to later generations by 
engaging in a certain amount of environmental preservation. Although there is no 
one-to-one correspondence, Barry’s notion of opportunities and productive capacity 
are clear descendants of Rawsian primary goods.  
 Intergenerational resourcism has also been defended by a number of other 
theorists (Page 1983; Howarth 1997; Dobson 1998:43ff; and Baxter 1999:91ff). Brian 
Baxter, for example, argues that ‘we should leave future generations of humans (and 
non-humans) no worse off than we found them, bequeathing an environment in which 
their opportunities for existence and flourishing are no worse [than ours]’ (1999:95). 
Baxter departs from Barry in that he endorses an account of the scope of justice that 
views at least some non-humans as subjects of justice. Moreover, Baxter argues that, 
in some circumstances, earlier generations might be obliged to improve, and not 
merely preserve, the range of opportunities bequeathed to later generations. Although 
there are interesting differences between Barry and Baxter, both are resourcists in the 
sense that it is the various opportunities conferred by natural resources, and not the 
welfare  produced by their consumption, that constitute the currency by which 
alternative social policies should be evaluated. 
 Applied to global climate change, resourcism regards the climate system as a 
peculiarly important ‘global resource’ which provides benefits that must be protected 
and divided fairly amongst all generations. The present generation is bound by a duty 
of justice not to engage in activities that modify the climate system with adverse 
results that cannot be offset by compensatory measures, as well as by a duty to 
respect the principle that each person has an equal right to release carbon and other 
pollutants into the atmosphere (Barry 2005:266-68). The notion of compensation, 
however, leaves it open for a generation to consume natural resources if they provide 
successor generations with access to a comparable resource (or, more accurately, the 
opportunities that this resource provides) so that the recipient generation is left no 
worse off than it would have been. Because it allows for substitutions of natural 
resources and technology, this approach avoids the ‘absurd strong sustainability’ of a 
view that denied that any consumption of non-renewable natural resources is 
justifiable (Howarth 1997:575). Obvious examples of such compensation in the 
intergenerational context would be the way in which improvements in energy 
efficiency of existing technologies, or the introduction of alternative energy 
technologies, can compensate for the losses of future opportunity brought about by 
the consumption of non-renewables such as coal or natural gas (Barry 1999:109).  
 The resourcism espoused by Barry and Rawls has been criticised by 
environmental theorists on a number of grounds. First, it fails to address the suspicion 
that some environmental impacts might be incompensable in the sense that no amount 
of compensation can offset the damage their loss does to human well-being (Dobson 
1998:161ff). For example, how might we compensate future generations for the loss 
of a beautiful coastline, animal species, or ancestral home?  
 Second, resourcism encourages a questionable conception of sustainability 
where improvements in human resources can often, if not in all circumstances, offset 
degradations in natural resources (Daly 1995:52ff; Dobson 1998:41-43). In rejecting 
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approach avoids the charge that it is ‘weakly sustainable’ in the sense that human and 
natural resources are merely instruments in desire satisfaction. Yet, the approach, as it 
has been developed by Barry and others, wavers between regarding human and 
natural resources as complements (both must be protected separately) or close 
substitutes (the focus should be on their combined preservation). Without such a 
clarification, the resourcist rejection of welfarism is no guarantee of a ‘strong 
sustainability’ approach to future generations. 
 A third, arguably more fundamental, problem is that is that some people, 
despite possessing identical bundles of impersonal resources as others, might still 
enjoy a low quality of life as a result of experiencing a disadvantage inherent to their 
physical or mental constitution. In such circumstances, a high level of impersonal 
resource possession does not seem to provide a plausible indication of a person’s life-
prospects and therefore a cogent currency of justice. Consider once again the future 
victims of climate change. Global warming and sea-level rises are expected to 
increase mortality and morbidity in many regions as a result of increasing the 
frequency and intensity of storms, floods, forest fires and heat-waves. Yet, it is 
unclear how many climate impacts can be explained in terms of deficits in impersonal 
resources. Some will concern adverse changes in the physical and mental states of 
persons, such as their health or talents, rather than the goods required by persons to 
pursue the life that they have reason to value. The problem is equally applicable to 
existing persons: a simple resourcism of primary goods, productive capacity, or 
equality of opportunity seems an inadequate foundation for justice within or between 
generations since it fails to address a critical source of disadvantage.  
 One response to the above problem would be to widen the net of resourcist 
justice to cater for deprivations of personal resources, such as ill health, and then 
apply the expanded currency to issues of distribution within and between generations. 
The idea, as Ronald Dworkin has put it, is that we should not only seek to eradicate 
inequalities in holdings of income and wealth, but also those that result from unequal 
distribution of talents and handicaps (2000:79ff). The problem that exercises 
Dworkin is how to define a distribution of impersonal resources that would best 
approximate the situation where all undeserved disadvantages are removed whether 
they originate in impersonal or personal resource deficiencies. Simply put, Dworkin 
argues that we reach this distribution by imagining how much people would insure 
themselves against living a life disrupted by either form of disadvantage if they were 
free and equal participants in a hypothetical choice situation. The level of cover that 
an average person of normal prudence would freely choose to purchase would then be 
translated, through social taxation, into a redistributive welfare system (Dworkin 
2000:73ff).  
 A key concept in Dworkin’s resourcism is the notion of ‘envy elimination.’ 
Someone envies another person, in the technical sense of the term, when they prefer 
to their own that person’s bundle of impersonal and personal resources. Recall that, to 
the extent that future generations inherit a damaged environment within which to 
pursue their life plans, intergenerational justice of impersonal resources regards these 
people as deserving of compensation. We could say that this theory endorses the test 
that no generation should be put in the position where they have reason to envy the 
impersonal resources enjoyed by earlier generations. As we saw, climate change is 
also set to affect adversely the personal resources of future persons by increasing 
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greenhouse emitting nations adopt stringent policies of mitigation and adaptation over 
the coming decades, it is likely that future generations will have ample reason to envy 
the personal resources enjoyed by their predecessors. Because their envy arises from 
the adoption of policies for which they cannot be held responsible, future generations 
will have a clear complaint that additional measures should have been undertaken by 
their predecessors to mitigate, or adapt to, climate change. In this way, Dworkin’s 
modification of the resourcist metric supports key aspects of the Barry/Baxter 
approach while giving it greater philosophical sophistication. Yet, in suggesting that 
each generation should pass on to the next at least as good an impersonal resource 
base as it inherited, as well as undertaking additional investments to avoid causing 
undeserved inequalities of personal resources in the future, a Dworkinian approach 
suggests that impersonal resourcism underestimates the duties of intergenerational 
justice.  
 One problem with a Dworkinian approach is that, despite embracing personal 
resource inequalities, it underplays the heterogeneity of human well-being. In 
particular, it seems to reduce the value of human ends to the resources that facilitate 
them (Sen 1984:316ff) and cannot deal intuitively with disadvantages that are 
harmful but not debilitating (Cohen 1989:918ff). I turn to the former criticism in the 
next section, but one example used to illustrate the latter is that of chronic pain. The 
incidence of chronic pain is sensitive to a number of changes in environmental 
variables such as pollution, temperature, and air pressure; and there is strong 
evidence that the incidence of these conditions will increase as a result of climate 
change (McMichael and Githeko 2001:473-74). Climate change will also increase the 
incidence of mental illness, such as clinical depression and generalised anxiety. All of 
these conditions, however, can be present in patients without showing up as physical 
abnormalities as is demonstrated by the fact that scientists cannot usually establish 
their physical causes. As such, these conditions seem more fruitfully developed in 
terms of an alternative conception of a person’s advantage.  
 Developing intergenerational justice in terms of impersonal and personal 
resources raises a further problem. This is that earlier generations could manipulate 
the genes of their descendants so the latter are better able to fulfil their life-plans in a 
world blighted by climate change. Although gene manipulation technology is in its 
infancy, a great deal of research has already been conducted by geneticists who hope 
to offer parents not just the possibility of screening potential offspring for severe 
medical conditions but also to give their offspring additional genes to help them 
flourish in the context of a changing human and natural environment (Silver 
1999:266ff). The result of implementing such technology would be that an earlier 
generation could finesse its resourcist duty to protect and preserve a hospitable 
climate system so long as it also provides personal resource enhancements of a 
sufficient size to outweigh the damages that result from climate change.  
 
Ecological Space and Justice 
 
The ambiguous implications of resourcism for our dealings with future generations 
and the natural world have led some to propose a new currency of justice called 
ecological space. Ecological space refers to the amount of ecologically productive 
land and water required to produce goods and services, as well as to assimilate the 
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have as individuals, nations or generations on the environment in terms of the natural 
resources required to sustain current consumption patterns. The amount of ecological 
space taken up by an entity corresponds to that entity’s ecological footprint 
(Wackernagel and Rees 1996:3ff; Chambers, Simmons and Wackernagel 2000:29ff).  
 Justice of ecological space can be defined as the view that each human being 
should be allocated a share of ecological space consistent with some preferred pattern 
of distribution and with the long-term security and flourishing of biosphere (Dobson 
2003:101ff; Hayward 2006:359ff). According to the egalitarian version of this view, 
each person is allocated the right to use an equal amount of productive land and water 
subject to the constraint that the total amount of ecological space distributed across 
all generations and populations is consistent with the preservation of the earth’s 
ability to sustain life indefinitely (Chambers, Simmons, and Wackernagel 2000:46-
48). 
 The key idea behind justice of ecological space is that any generation that 
enjoys more than its fair share of ecological space exists in a state of ‘ecological 
space debt’ that mandates redistributive action to reduce this debt and, where 
possible, restore a fair distribution of each generation’s ecological footprint. In 
certain extreme cases, earlier generations might consume so much more than their fair 
share of the biosphere that they preclude the possibility of any later generation 
enjoying an equitable ecological footprint. In such circumstances, a state of 
permanent ecological space debt, and therefore intergenerational injustice, will 
obtain.  
 A useful example of how such a debt might arise is developed by Chambers, 
Simmons and Wackernagel in terms of global climate change. Although the empirical 
claims at the heart of the example are controversial, they are broadly compatible with 
recent research on the costs of climate change by the IPCC as well as the UK 
Government (IPCC 2001; Stern 2007). The authors argue that, ‘assuming a global 
target of 11.1 gigatonnes CO2 emissions is required to maintain climate stability by 
2050, and assuming that global population in 2050 is 9.8 billion, the per capita 
[ecological space] for energy is 1.1 tonnes per year’ (Chambers, Simmons, and 
Wackernagel 1996:21; Dobson 2003:101f). All developed countries currently emit 
more than 1.1 tonnes of CO2 per capita. The members of the G8 group of countries, 
for example, emitted between 1.69 and 5.52 tonnes of carbon per inhabitant in 2002 
(CDIAC 2005). So using carbon emissions as a proxy for ecological space usage 
suggests that all developed countries are currently in ecological space debt to future 
generations. In fact, it is not just the rich countries that are so indebted since 88 
countries emitted more than 1.1 tonnes of CO2 per inhabitant in 2002 (CDIAC 2005).  
 Justice of ecological space can be viewed as a reformist version of impersonal 
resourcism, rather than a radical alternative. This is because it retains a focus on an 
all-purpose-means required by all to lead the life they value, rather than a direct 
measure of well-being. Moreover, it is not concerned directly with the distribution of 
personal resources, such talents and handicaps. It is, however, distinct from the views 
discussed above in that it focuses on distributing the impacts of human activity on 
environmental integrity rather than reducing justice to a matter of achieving a fair 
distribution of the divisible goods that nature, and human ingenuity, provides. In this 
sense, it focuses on the consequences of having a particular resource holding for the 
8 environment rather than the absolute or comparative value of a person’s resource 
share. The approach will take some account of personal resource inequalities, since 
differences in personal resources such as physical health modify each person’s 
ecological footprint. However, the ecological impact of such personal heterogeneities 
are greatly outweighed by other factors, such as social patterns of energy and land use 
(Wackernagel and Rees 1996:61ff).   
 The currency of ecological space raises a number of fascinating issues that I 
have insufficient space to deal with here. One of the key issues concerns its scope. 
Whereas the established currencies are designed to apply to relations within a single 
generation, with their intergenerational implications being a matter of further 
deliberation, ecological space turns this methodological approach on its head by 
embracing an explicit commitment to intergenerational justice at the outset. The 
question arises, then, to what extent ecological space can provide the basis of a 
cogent and comprehensive theory of distribution within a given generation, 
particularly where many issues of inequity cannot be traced to environmental 
problems. A further problem is that it seems to share the weakness of other resourcist 
currencies in that it is too indirectly connected to human well-being to be a coherent 
focus of our distributive concerns. Having a greater (or lesser) impact on the 
environment does not, for example, translate particularly closely into greater (or 
lesser) levels of well-being. Those living in colder climates, for example, may require 
more ecological space than others to maintain a decent quality of life, so a strict 
egalitarian interpretation of the approach would itself seem unjust. Meanwhile, a 
person’s ecological footprint has no connection to disadvantages grounded in 
conditions such as chronic pain, depression or generalised anxiety that cannot always 
be traced to environmental problems. Ecological space may yet provide the basis of a 
coherent environmental ethic, but it is at best an incomplete account of distributive 
justice.  
 
Capabilities, Functionings and Justice 
The currency of ‘capabilities to function’ focuses on people’s substantive freedom to 
achieve the life that they have reason to value. According to the influential version of 
the view outlined by Amartya Sen, the things people have reason to value are human 
‘functionings’ and the ‘capabilities’ to achieve them. Functionings are abilities or 
states of mind (‘doings’ and ‘beings’) that are often secured by income, wealth and 
personal liberty, but which are also affected by non-resourcist factors such as the 
attitudes of others. Sen discusses a somewhat eclectic set of functionings such as 
personal mobility, being well nourished, possessing adequate clothing and shelter, the 
possession of self-respect and undertaking meaningful work (Sen 1999:73ff).  
 A person’s capabilities, by contrast, reflect ‘the alternative combination of 
functionings [they] can achieve, and from which he or she can chose one collection’ 
(Sen 1993:31). ‘Capability’, Sen writes elsewhere, ‘is a kind of freedom: the 
substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations’ (Sen 1999:75). 
As an egalitarian, Sen holds that each person should enjoy roughly similar sets of 
capabilities to achieve valued functionings. To the extent that poverty, poor 
environmental conditions, physical handicap or inequitable social arrangements 
prevent a person experiencing the capability (or substantive freedom) to achieve the 
same level of functioning as others, then an injustice obtains.  
9  Sen’s focus on capabilities and functionings marks a significant step away from 
welfarism and resourcism. Consider the functioning of being well-nourished. The 
distributive importance of food for welfarists is that its consumption satisfies human 
desires thereby promoting welfare; and for resourcists it is that food can itself be 
viewed as an intrinsically valuable commodity. For Sen, however, a reliable source of 
good quality food is valuable only because it facilitates ‘the capability of functioning 
in a particular way, e.g. without nutritional deficiencies of particular types’ (Sen 
1984:316). It is these capabilities to function, and not the goods instrumental to their 
provision or the welfare they promote, that should be the focus of distributive justice. 
 A just outcome, for Sen, requires differential distributions of resources even 
though it can be difficult to distinguish a capability inequality from a resource 
inequality. A person with a lower metabolic rate, for example, requires less food in 
order to continue to be well nourished than a person with a higher metabolic rate. 
Other things being equal, the former will have a superior ‘capability set’ in the sense 
that they have a real advantage in achieving the life that they value. Such persons 
have no complaint if more income and wealth is diverted to others to maintain 
capability equality. Similarly, those suffering from medical conditions, or facing 
harsh physical environments, may require more resources than others to enjoy the 
same quality of life (measured in terms of capabilities) (Sen 1999:70). Moreover, the 
fact that people adapt their desires to suit their social and physical environment 
means that equalising capabilities to function will often require unequal distributions 
of welfare since there are some human capabilities (such as personal mobility) whose 
absence is significant from the point of view of justice even if its absence does not 
cause a reduction in welfare (Sen 1984:318).   
 Sen’s account of capabilities to function has been usefully developed by Martha 
Nussbaum. Nussbaum develops a version of capability justice according to which 
justice involves helping all persons reach the point where they have ‘a realistic option 
of exercising the most valuable functions’ (Nussbaum 1999:46). Like Sen, Nussbaum 
holds that it is the capability to achieve valuable functionings and not the actual 
achievement, or experience, of functionings that should be the focus of distributive 
justice (1999:29ff). That is, Nussbaum argues that justice involves no guarantee that 
all persons remain healthy throughout a normal lifespan or that they can undertake 
satisfying work during the entirety of their adult life, but rather that all persons 
experience the capability to realise these valuable functionings if they behave 
responsibly (2006a:171-73). A further refinement is that Nussbaum, more explicitly 
than Sen, emphasises that capabilities and functionings are specified and revised 
within the context of the constitutional framework of a liberal society. The idea is that 
capability justice must be developed in a way that is tolerant and respectful of the 
choices people make and the diverging conceptions of the good life they possess 
(Nussbaum 2006b:53ff).  
 A central pillar of Nussbaum’s theory of justice is a definitive specification of 
the key capabilities to function. Whereas Sen provides numerous examples of 
capabilities and functionings, he has so far declined to offer a systematic listing of 
capabilities or define their relative importance. Nussbaum, by contrast, defends a list 
of ten ‘central human functional capabilities’ (Nussbaum 2006a:76ff; 2006b:51ff):  
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 1. Life 6.   Practical reason 
2. Bodily health 7.   Affiliation 
3. Bodily integrity 8.   (A relationship with) Other species 
4. Senses, imagination, and 
thought 
9.   Play 
5. Emotions 10. Political and material control  over 
one’s environment 
 According to Nussbaum, a person deficient in any of these ten capabilities fails 
to lead a fully human and dignified life. Deficiencies in any capability, moreover, 
cannot be offset by enhancing the provision of one or more of the others. The idea is 
that a just distribution of wealth would enable each and every person a sufficient 
allocation of each capability and where this is not possible the goal is that as many 
people as possible should be so benefited. Inequalities above the point where all have 
enough of each capability are not dealt with and in this sense Nussbaum’s theory is a 
hybrid of equality and sufficiency (Arneson 2006: 23ff).   
 Neither Sen nor Nussbaum extend their accounts of capability justice 
systematically to questions of distribution between generations. This is perhaps 
surprising given that both authors argue that a distinctive merit of the capability 
currency is that it can ground a truly global theory of justice (Sen 1999:318-19; 
Nussbaum 2006a:272ff); and, in Nussbaum’s case, the approach is designed to 
regulate dealings between humans and other species (Nussbaum 2006a:325ff). 
However, the approach can be extended to deal with problems of futurity in at least 
two ways. First, by widening the list of functioning capabilities to include a separate 
capability to represent the value a person derives from operating within a hospitable 
natural environment. Second, by acknowledging the impact of existing persons on 
their successors in terms of established capabilities and functionings (Sen, 2004; 
Kamsler 2006:202ff).      
 The thought behind introducing a new capability is that acts and social policies 
that alter, or degrade, the natural environment deprive future persons of a separate 
‘ecological functioning capability’ that is not reducible to other capabilities such as 
physical health or bodily integrity. Nussbuam herself seems to be hinting at such a 
capability when she suggests that all persons require ‘a healthy relationship with 
other species: being able to live with concern for an in relation to animals, plants, and 
the world of nature’ (Nussbaum 2006a:77). Yet, this capability is both controversial 
and unintuitive in that it implies that acts or policies that exacerbate climate change 
are unjust because they harm non-human animals (or our ‘relations’ with animals) 
and not that it undermines the well-being of future persons as such. A more radical, 
yet more intuitive, alternative would be to extend the list of capabilities to include the 
capability to experience life in an environment devoid of dangerous environmental 
impacts such as those associated with climate change. Here, we view a safe and 
hospitable environment as a vital, ingredient of a decent life rather than a facilitator 
of other functionings such as ‘play’, ‘emotions’, or ‘control over one’s environment’ 
(which, despite its label, has no direct connection to environmental values).   
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  In terms of exploiting established capabilities, climate change is set to affect 
the ability of both existing and future people to convert resources into valuable 
functionings in ways that affect many of the capabilities discussed by Sen and 
Nussbaum. In particular, they threaten life itself, bodily health and bodily integrity. 
These capabilities will be threatened even if the share of primary goods and 
ecological space available to future generations is at least as generous as that enjoyed 
by the present generation. The key point is that the widespread, and generally 
disruptive, impacts of climate change will limit the capabilities of many millions of 
future persons. First, these impacts will modify, and introduce, a range of 
‘environmental diversities’ that degrade the capabilities to function facilitated by 
impersonal resources such as clothing and shelter. Sen himself hints at the problem 
when he notes that ‘variations in environmental conditions, such as climatic 
circumstances (temperature ranges, rainfall, flooding and so on), can influence what a 
person gets out of a given level of income’ (Sen 1999:70).  
 Second, climate impacts will affect quite directly ‘personal heterogeneities’ 
such as mental illness, physical disability and lifespan. A useful example concerns the 
future impact of climate change on food production and food security. Reliable 
sources of good quality food are crucial for the development and health of human 
populations and recent research suggests that climate change will alter the total 
amount, and nutritional quality, of the food that will be available to future 
populations. Sea level rises, for example, are expected to bring about loss of land, soil 
infertility and loss of fresh water for irrigation projects. As a result, food production 
and nutrition in many coastal regions will be undermined (Gitay et al. 2001:270ff). 
The IPCC’s 1996 assessment found that anything between 40 and 300 million people 
could be expected to suffer from malnutrition in the year 2060 as a consequence of 
climate change (McMichael et al. 1996:577). The IPCC’s 2001 assessment added that 
‘degradation of oil and water resources is one of the major future challenges for 
global agriculture. These processes are likely to be intensified by adverse change in 
temperature and precipitation’ (Gitay et al. 2001:238). Taking nutritional status and 
bodily health as our starting point, it seems clear that climate change will affect the 
distribution of capabilities to function across generations. Policies for the 
management of climate change, therefore, are firmly the concern of capability justice.  
 One advantage of the ‘capabilities to function’ approach is that it seems to 
explain the duties of justice posited by resourcists and welfarists without raising some 
of the problems of these currencies. Recall that welfarist theories of justice 
experience difficulties when faced with people whose desires have been distorted by 
their poor circumstances. Future people who adapt their desires in the face of 
environmental degradation may experience more welfare than their ancestors even if 
they possess far fewer resources. We can say that such people enjoy superior sets of 
possible ‘life-plans’ in the space of welfare compared with those of their ancestors 
and should not be compensated according to welfarist thinking. According to 
capability justice, this line of reasoning is bizarre. Justice consists rather in 
recognising the claims of the disadvantaged even if their welfare is as high as others. 
On this view, we should value a hospitable environment because it is an integral 
feature of a life of decent quality and not because it facilitates desire satisfaction.    
 Next, consider those who experience chronic pain or ecological space debt. 
Such people experience symptoms of significant pain or do not have access to the 
environmental resources to which they are entitled. This pain, or ecological debt, 
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 could be predictably eased if appropriate help was awarded. Capability justice seems 
well placed to explain why ignoring the case for compensation in such cases is a 
matter of injustice. Through no fault of their own, these persons experience 
undeserved deficiencies in their capability to function and should, where possible, be 
compensated. But the reason for the compensation is not located in the distribution of 
impersonal or personal resources. It would persist even if the relevant disadvantages 
could not be framed in personal resource terms (as seems to be the case with chronic 
pain) or in terms of ecological space (as is the case of inequities that are not tied to 
environmental damage).    
 Focusing on capabilities suggests that earlier generations should not act so as to 
undermine the possibility that later generations enjoy an acceptable (Nussbaum) or 
equal (Sen) level of capability satisfaction. To the extent that global environmental 
problems make it impossible for future people to enjoy adequate or equal levels of 
capability, these problems (and the actions and policies that exacerbated them) 
involve great injustice. As Sen puts it, the idea is that we should be ‘concerned with 
preserving - and where possible expanding - the substantive freedoms of people today 
without compromising the ability of future generations to have similar, or more, 
freedoms’ (Sen 2004:1).  
 
Conclusion 
The above sketch of a capability-based approach to intergenerational justice leaves a 
number of issues unaddressed. Some have objected that any determinate listing of 
goods necessary for a decent life is perfectionistic because it violates the principle 
that the state should remain neutral between different conceptions of what makes life 
go well (Brighouse 2002:76-80; Deneulin 2002:509ff). In Nussbaum’s case, the 
alleged mistake is that she identifies the life led above the threshold of dignity as 
superior to one below this threshold and in so doing fails to treat all persons as 
equals. Instead, it is argued, a just society should not promote any one conception of a 
good or decent life but rather protect the viability of a wide range of such 
conceptions. A related objection is the capability approach is paternalistic since, in a 
range of circumstances, it will interfere with a person’s pursuit of their conception of 
the good for their own benefit. It would potentially mandate compensation for the 
disadvantaged in terms of improving their capability set even if the recipients would 
prefer to be compensated in terms of a different metric (or not at all); or impose 
certain levels of functioning in order to protect the capabilities of those that behave 
recklessly. 
 However, both of these objections underestimate the subtly of Nussbaum’s 
view. As we have seen, the primary focus here is on capability rather than 
functioning. Individuals who freely choose to lead lives of poor quality will receive 
no special treatment at the bar of capability justice (Nussbaum 2006b:53-4; 2000:96). 
Moreover, the specification of the list is neither absolute nor insensitive to social or 
historical context. It is to be modified in the light of public debate and reflection 
(Nussbaum 2006:53). Importantly, the list of functioning capabilities includes only a 
small number of core capabilities that together specifies the minimum conditions 
necessary for citizens to take full part in the life of their community (Nussbaum 
2006b:59-60). Nussbaum explains that the list is not a complete specification of 
human well-being, but rather ‘can be endorsed for political purposes, as the moral 
basis of central constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very 
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 different views of what a complete good life for a human would be.’ (Nussbuam 
2000:74). Yet, there is a sense in which the approach is perfectionist for it will 
prohibit consumption patterns and lifestyles which harm the central functioning 
capabilities of others; and intervene to guarantee a certain minimum level of 
functioning where persons engage in practices that involve them losing their dignity 
or self-respect, being oppressed, or in other ways ceasing to function as a free and 
equal citizen (Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2006a:172).   
 Finally, we must deal with what has become known as the indexing problem 
(Brighouse 2004:71-80). To assess the comparative fortunes of contemporaries and 
non-contemporaries, we must be able to determine their enjoyment of the central 
functioning capabilities. The problem is that unless one person enjoys all of the 
capabilities that another person has their sets of capabilities do not overlap. In such 
cases, it seems impossible to make a meaningful judgment about who has the more 
urgent claims. Imagine, for example, that two friends are otherwise identically 
endowed except that one is susceptible to bouts of depression while the other has a 
learning disorder. In such circumstances, people’s ‘capability sets’ are not directly 
comparable and seem of limited value as a currency of justice. Who should receive 
state help, for example, if only one help package could be provided?  
 Nussbaum’s account of the ‘central functioning capabilities’, in assuming that 
each dignified life requires a certain amount of each capability, finesses the indexing 
problem to some extent. We do not need exact interpersonal comparisons of 
capabilities, for example, to identify those who have insufficient of at least one 
central functioning capability. Our two friends, despite having non-comparable 
disabilities, can be seen as being equally disadvantaged in the sense that they both 
lead lives below the dignity threshold. Both should then be viewed as being equally 
deserving of state support even if only one can be so helped. In this sense, 
Nussbaum’s version of capability justice, because it has a satisficing rather than 
equalising structure, can cope with more indeterminacy than Sen’s. Yet the flexibility 
created by refusing to make trade-offs between capabilities below some threshold of 
minimum functioning also means that, as it stands, Nussbaum’s list implausibly 
attributes equal value to all of the ten central functioning capabilities from ‘life’ and 
‘bodily health’ through to ‘play’ and ‘a relationship with other species.’   
 Suppose that we depart from Nussbuam by giving more weight to some of the 
central functioning capabilities than to others. The idea would be that some 
capabilities are ‘vital’ and outweigh other ‘non-vital’ capabilities. A new indexing 
problem will resurface in cases where everyone lives above the point where their vital 
capabilities (such as bodily health and integrity) are fulfilled. In such circumstances, 
which arguably obtain today in most developed countries, people will differ only in 
terms of non-vital capabilities (such as play or relations with other species). How 
might we distinguish between the claims of those who enjoy all of the vital 
capabilities but lack varying non-vital capabilities? In terms of the approach outlined 
earlier, an important issue that requires more space than I have here to discuss is 
whether the proposed ‘ecological capability’, if defensible, is itself vital or non-vital. 
But the broader issue remains how the capability approach can deal with the 
undeserved disadvantage of those above the decency threshold. The lot of those 
existing and future persons fortunate enough to lead decent lives might seem a trivial 
matter in light of the millions who live today so far below any realistic threshold of 
decency. Yet, the suspicion remains that a credible account of justice must explain 
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 how a favoured currency should be distributed in fortunate as well as unfortunate 
circumstances.   
Notes 
I would like to thank Simon Caney, Clare Heyward and two anonymous referees for 
useful comments and suggestions on a previous draft of this article. 
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